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COMMENT
holder within the meaning of the irrigation district statutes." We are
again presented with the familiar post-Ashford pattern of inconsist-
ency a purchaser has no "interest" but is a property holder I Another
recent case found that a purchaser has certain rights "annexed to and
exercisable with reference to" land which are sufficient to permit him to
defend, and possibly even to maintain, an action to quiet title.8" The
first question that comes to mind is how one can defend a title which the
Askford case specifically says he doesn't havel Yet the court goes on
to reiterate that the Ashford case is still good law in this state.
So we have a picture of the manner in which our court has tacitly
slipped out from under the Ashford case and in a large number of sub-
sequent decisions has endowed the purchaser with all the attributes of
title which are conferred by the doctrine of equitable ownershnp. As we-
have indicated before, the doctrine of equitable ownership is simply a
convenient expression for explaining the protection of the purchaser's
obvious equities in the land."3 It is the writer's contention that the court
has recognized these equities to an extent that is entirely incompatible
with a denial of the doctrine.
It was suggested in a concurring decision to the Aslford case that the
decision therein reached, while out of line and without sound analytic
basis, was yet so woven into the fabric of our real property law even at
that time that it must be affirmed for the sake of stability If this was
true at that time, it is certainly so no longer, for the court has made so
many exceptions that the principal rule exists now only in name. A
forthright repudiation of the language of Ashford v. Reese, msofar as it
rejected the doctrine of equitable ownership, would not only remove
numerous inconsistencies in the court's present position but would also
clear the atmosphere of our property law.
"I 're Horse Heaven Irrigation District. 11 Wn.(2d) 218, 118 P (2d) 972
(1941) The particular statute considered was REM. REV. STAT. (1932) § 7528,
which provides for irrigation district elections by such voters as "hold title
or evidence of title to land" in the district.
31,Turpen v. Johnson, 126 Wash. Dec. 674 (1946)
"Stone, Equitable Converston by Contract (1913) 13 COL. L. REV. 369.
THE 1943 WASHINGTON ARBITRATION ACT
Jomi C. BRAmw
I.
INTRODUCTION
Changes in the arbitration laws of the State 6f Washington effected
by the 1943 Act, can be expected to increase the effectiveness of written
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arbitration agreements as a means of settling controversies.' The new
act is patterned after the old Washington act of 188i,' which was
repealed n toto, but its scope is larger and it is more specific m pro-
viding legal machinery for the conduct of arbitration.
Because of World War II and the use of government agencies as
mediators of disputes, instead of private arbitration agreements, the
new act to date has not been the subject of litigation m the Supreme
Court of Washington. It is, however, similar to legislation which has
been enacted in several states within the past few years,' and which
has proved effective in settling both commercial and labor controver-
sies.
Major departures from the old act are the provisions (i) that future
as well as present controversies may be the subject of written arbitra-
tion agreements,l (2) that labor controversies may be the subject of
arbitration under the act but are not within the act unless specifically
so stated,' and (3) that disputes involving title to real estate are not
excepted from the act.8 Courts are also given more explicit power to
enforce the arbitration of controversies, and to enforce, modify, or
vacate an award.!
The act provides for voluntary, not compulsory, arbitration agree-
ments. The purpose of such arbitration agreements is to provide an
inexpensive, speedy, private, and effective method of deciding con-
troversies out of court.' This method is advantageous both to clients
and to attorneys. Immediate settlement of controversies by arbitration
removes the necessity of waiting-out a crowded court docket, of main-
' Wash. Laws 1943, c. 13, §§ 1-23; REm. REV. STAT. § 430; PERCE'S CODE § 8.
2 REM. REv. STAT. H9 420-430; PIERCE'S CODE § 7339-7349.
s Calif., C. C. P §§ 1280-1293 (1927); Conn., Title 58, c. 302 H 5840-5856 (1929),
N. Y., C. P A. § 1448-1466 (1937), Ore. CIvIL PocEnuR, C. 6, §§ 11-601 to 11-613
(1925)
4REm. REV. STAT. § 430-1.
5Ibid.
6 Ibzd.
TREm. REV. STAT. § 430-2 reads: "The term 'court' when used in this act means
any superior court of the State of Washington or the Supreme Court of the
State of Washington."
8 See Martin v. Vansant, 99 Wash. 106, 108, 168 Pac. 990, 991 (1917), where
the court said, in dictum, "The very decided tendency of modern times, how-
ever, is away from the artificial common law doctrine and in the direction of
the more intelligent view that arbitration, as an inexpensive, speedy, and
amicable method of settling disputes, should receive every encouragment from
the courts, so long as it may be extended without contravening sound public
policy or settled law."
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taming contact with witnesses for several months, and virtually elimi-
nates, where the arbitration is well conducted, the expense and delay
of appeals, as they are seldom taken.9 The controversy is heard by an
arbitrator or arbitrators chosen, m most cases, by the parties them-
selves, thus assuring an arbitrator who is familiar with the problems
involved in and peculiar to the immediate controversy-a benefit to all
parties.
At common law the effectiveness of arbitration agreements was
seriously weakened by the doctrine that unless mutually agreed to, the
award was not binding.10 It was also believed that arbitration of future
disputes usurped the authority and power of the courts." Tls doctrine
has been repudiated. According to the present doctrine, parties may
bind themselves by contract; and such a contract is enforceable and
irrevocable, in the absence of fraud and duress and is subject only to
defenses that are good against contracts generally 1 Recent statutes
for voluntary arbitration have been held constitutional in most states,
including Washington, and the awards of arbitrators are binding and
enforceable through the courts."
II.
SCOPE O ACT
The new act provides that two or more parties may agree in writing
to submit to arbitration any existing controversy which may be the
subject of an action; or that they may include m a written agreement
a provision to arbitrate any controversy thereafter arising between
them, out of or in relation to such agreement, and that this agreement
shall be valid, enforceable, and irrevocable save upon such grounds as
exist in law or equity for the revocation of any agreement. Unless the
IJ. Raymond Tiffany, Talk It Out, Ti RoTrAsRL, Jan. 1944, reports: " of
some 14,000 cases the American Arbitration Association has decided only six
had been appealed to the courts, and in no case had any of these decisions been
reversed."
20 Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Sound Const & Eng. Co., 92 Wash. 316, 319, 159 Pac.
129, 131 (1916).
11 State ex tel. Fancher v. Everett, 144 Wash. 592, 594, 258 Pac. 486, 487 (1927).
12 Tacoma Ry. & Motor Co. v. Cummings, 5 Wash. 208, 31 Pac. 747, 33 Pac. 507
(1892); McElroy v. Hooper, 70 Wash. 347, 126 Pac. 925 (1912); Dickie Mfg. Co.
v. Sound Const. Co., 92 Wash. 316, 159 Pac. 129 (1916), cited supra note 10; Red
Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 68 L. ed. 582, 44 Sup. Ct. 274
(1924); 69 A. L. R. 816; Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America,
25 F. (2d) 930 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928)
1 Ibtd. See 17 CALF. L. REv. 643. For strict construction of New York statute,
see In re Kelley, 240 N. Y. 74, 147 N. E. 363 (1925); IZn re S. M. Goldbery Enter-
prises Inc., 130 Misc. 887, 225 N. Y. Supp. 513 (1927)
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agreement specifically provides, the provisions of the act shall not
apply to any arbitration agreement between employers and employees
or between employers and associations of employees.'
Whether or not an arbitration agreement comprehends a dispute
depends upon the contract and the intent of the parties. Washington
cases for the past several years have favored and upheld enforcement
of arbitration agreements.' It is therefore probable that disputes
arising from ambiguous agreements will be resolved in favor of the
party desiring to arbitrate, in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence that the dispute was not within the scope of the agreement or
that there was fraud or some other defense to the contract.
Under the old act, the court distinguished between statutory arbi-
tration and common law appraisal. The former was generally a method
of settling existing disputes between parties, where as the latter was
generally a method of settling the question of value, price, amount of
damage, or other incidents of a contract before a dispute had arisen."
While the cases held that these agreements for future appraisals did
not come within the old arbitration act, they did hold them to be spe-
cifically enforceable contracts, and the awards were given effect."1
Whether a contract for future appraisal comes within the new act as
a "controversy arising in the future" is not clear from a reading of
the act. In the light of past decisions in Washington, where there is
no dispute but only a question of value, price, and so forth, to be
found, there is no controversy, and therefore the contract would not
come within the act. However, the court may well see fit to enlarge
its previous interpretations of controversy to include future appraisals,
and thus bring such contracts within the act.
It will be noted that the act permits arbitration of "any controversy
which may be the subject of an action."' 8 This embraces arbitration of
tort or negligence claims, property settlements in divorce actions
(though not divorce decrees) property disputes, industrial and labor
14 REm. REV. STAT. § 430-1.
1f Dickle Mfg. Co. v. Sound Const. & Eng. Co., 92 Wash. 316, 159 Pac. 129
(1926), cited supra note 10; In re Arbitration etc. v. Lake Washington etc., 1
Wn. (2d) 401, 96 P (2d) 929 (1939)
10 Martin v. Vansant, 99 Wash. 106, 116, 168 Pac. 990, 994 (1917), Gord v.
Harmon, 188 Wash. 134, 139, 61 P (2d) 1294, 1297 (1936)
7 Id. at 142; Hegeberg v. New England Fish Co., 7 Wn. (2d) 509, 521, 110 P (2d)
182, 186 (1941)
Is REm. REV. STAT. § 430-i.
COMMENT
controversies, price disputes, and other controversies too numerous to
mention.
The act provides that the court shall confirm an award made by an
arbitrator unless the award should be vacated, modified, or corrected in
accordance with the provisions in the act."9 Such a confirmation is a
judgment, and may be enforced and appealed from as an order of
judgment in any civil action. 0
An award may be vacated upon application to the court by a party
(a) where it was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means,
(b) where the arbitrators were partial or corrupt, (c) where the arbi-
trators were guilty of misconduct which was prejudicial to the rights of
any party, (d) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers or where
the award was imperfect, or (e) where there were irregularities in the
procedure. However, an award may not be vacated upon any ground
from (a) to (d) inclusive unless the court is.satisfied that substantial
rights of the parties were prejudiced thereby When an award is
vacated, the court is required to direct a rehearing before the same or
different arbitrators, according to its discretion."
Cases decided under a similar section of the old law have consistently
held that an arbitrator decides both the facts and the law,2 that the
error must appear upon the face of the award to be considered," and
that the court will not try a case de novo, but in event of error will
return it for another hearing by an arbitrator.2'
The court may modify or correct an award, upon the application of
any party, (a) where there was evident miscalculation of figures or an
evident mistake, (b) where the matter was not submitted to arbitra-
tion, or (c) where the award is imperfect in form or does not affect the
merits of the controversy - This section, though wider in scope, is
similar to REM. REv STAT. § 464, providing for vacation and modifica-
tion of judgments.
III.
ARBITRATION MANDATORY UNDER VALID AGREEMENT
Parties to a written agreement to arbitrate must submit a contro-
1 RE=, REV. STAT. § 430-15.
-Ol1d. § 430-21, 22.
2 1 1d. § 430-16.
2 2 Hatch v. Cole, 128 Wash. 107, 113, 222 Pac. 463, 464 (1924)
29 Puget Sound Bridge & Dredge Co. v. Frye, 142 Wash. 166, 177, 252 Pac. 546,
550 (1927)
2
' Hatch v. Cole, 128 Wash. 107, 114, 222 Pac. 463, 465 (1924)
25Fwn. REv. STAT. § 430-16; Carey v. Kerrick, 146 Wash. 283, 263 Pac. 190 (1928)
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versy arising thereunder to arbitration, as provided by the act and by
their agreement. Should a party refuse to arbitrate, and commence an
action, the other party may appeal to the court; and if the action is
referable to arbitration under the agreement, the court will stay the
action or proceeding until an arbitration has been had in accordance
with the agreement."8 This provision is a codification of previous
decisions."
Under the act, should a party neglect or refuse to arbitrate, the
other party may make application to the court for an order directing
the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the
agreement. The court will condutt a hearing, and if it is satisfied that
no substantial issue exists as to the validity or existence of the agree-
ment or the failure to comply therewith, it will issue the order. Should
the court find that a substantial issue is raised, the issue will be tried,
and if there was no written agreement providing for arbitration or
there has been no default in proceedings thereunder, the motion to
compel arbitration will be denied.28 This also is a codification of the
existing rule.2"
The act further provides that any party has the right to demand the
immediate trial by jury of any issue concerning the validity or exist-
ence of the agreement or the failure to comply therewith. In order to
raise an issue, a party must set forth evidentiary facts raising such
issue and must either (a) make a motion for a stay of the arbitration,
or (b) contest a motion to compel arbitration."0 This section has no
counterpart in the old act. It appears that its purpose is to satisfy the
right to jury trial as provided by the constitution."'
When the agreement contains no provisions for the appointment of
arbitrators, the act provides that application may be made to the
court for their appointment, and that upon application the court may
appoint arbitrators when for various reasons none have been appointed
by the parties.8 2 This section also has no counterpart in the old act.
26 REm. REv. STAT. § 430-3.
27 State ex rel. Fancher v. Everett, 144 Wash. 592, 595, 258 Pac. 486-487 (1927)
s Rm. REv. STAT. § 430-4.
29 State ex rel. Fancher v. Everett, 144 Wash. 592, 258 Pac. 486 (1927), cited
supra note 27, and see cases cited therein.
go R . REV. STAT. § 430-4(3)
31 WASH. CONST. Art. I, § 21.
12 REm. REV. STAT. § 430-5.
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Its manifest intention is to prevent failure of an arbitration agreement
for want of an arbitrator.
The act provides for service upon other parties to the arbitration
agreement when a controversy arises and is to be arbitrated. It further
provides that this notice shall state that unless within twenty (20) days
the party served shall serve a motion to stay arbitration, he shall
thereafter be barred from putting in issue the existence or validity of
the agreement or the failure to comply therewith. 8 Under the old act,
which had no such provision, the arbitration agreement was often con-
tested long after the notice to arbitrate was given. This new section
should hasten arbitration and reduce litigation.
In conducting a hearing, arbitrators generally have the same powers
as a court. They determine the time and place of hearing, may require
by subpoenae (which it is provided the courts shall enforce) the attend-
ance of witnesses, and may require books, records, documents or
other evidence to be brought in.8
Should arbitrators fail to call a timely hearing, they may be directed
by the court, upon application of a party, to proceed promptly with
the hearing and determination of the controversy 85 Unlike the old
act, the new act contains no provisions for punishing arbitrators by
contempt." Compensation for arbitrators is not specified or made
mandatory 7
Under the act, a party may be represented by an attorney at a
hearing. A party may also apply to the court for the preservation
of the property or for securing satisfaction of the award prior to the
final determination of the arbitration. 9 This provision in effect seems
to allow attachment of property prior to final award.
The award shall be in writing and signed by at least a majority of
the arbitrators-the number necessary to the rendition of an award. 0
Upon its rendition, a true copy of the arbitrator's decision shall be
delivered to each of the parties or their attorneys."1
Is Id. 1 430-6.
,Id. § 430-7, 11.
35 Id. § 430-7.
"IZd. § 428.
'1 Id. § 423.
I Zd. 430-10.
"Zd. § 430-13.
,0d. 430-7.
41Zd.§ 430-14.
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The legislature by this act has provided parties with a method of
settling their present or future controversies by arbitration under their
own written agreements. With thoughtful and clear drafting, and a
sincere intention by all parties to avoid litigation and to solve their
controversies amicably, this act can be expected to greatly reduce
litigation in civil controversies; to facilitate settlement of disputes
involving only nominal amounts; and to obviate much of the delay,
worry, expense and hard feelings which so often accompany litigation.42
"In Washington, the services of the American Arbitration Association are
available to parties desiring to arbitrate. It is a non-partisan, non-political, non-
profit-making organization, which will furnish upon request and for a nominal
sum a panel of arbitrators composed of local professional and business men who
volunteer their services. It has also established a set of rules governing the
mechanics of arbitration which parties may include in their written contracts.
INJURY BY ACCIDENTAL MEANS AND THE EFFECT OF
DISEASE IN ACCIDENT INSURANCE POLICIES
JENNINGS P FEr.LX
I.
INTRODUCTION
A troublesome problem in the field of accident insurance is the
interpretation of the phrase "by accidental means" and the effect of
pre-existing disease upon a case involving this interpretation. The
decisions vary, not only from state to state but often within the same
jurisdiction. This confused state' of case law results from the in-
numerable variety of fact patterns considered; and is due, in part,
to the well-recognized sympathy of jurors toward widows and orphans
who comprise the largest class of beneficiaries. The cases exemplify
two main views, each supported by considerable authority I Excluding
the factor of disease, the principal rules deducible from the cases are:
(i) The apparent majority view,2 that if the injury or death is the
result of the voluntary act of the insured, done in the manner intended
and unaccompanied by any unforeseen accidental cause, the injury
or death is not by accidental means; ' and
VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 868, § 257.
- 5 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1929) 868, § 1145.
3Id. at 4022.
'VANCE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 871.
